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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the incidence of a natural experiment entailed by the 2005 Ohio tax reform. 
The policy reduced the corporate and personal income taxes over the period 2006-2010. I observe 
several cross-sections of the Current Population Survey and compare individuals in Ohio to similar 
individuals in Pennsylvania. Using a triple difference identification approach, I conclude that the 
reform significantly boosted labor force participation for women, specifically those with 5-year-
old children and increased reported self-employment taxable earnings. However, it does not seem 
to have had a positive impact on corporate wages in the short-run.  
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1. Introduction  
Over the last few decades, the integration of the world economy enabled an unprecedented 
deepening of trade and international financial flows. One direct implication of this expansion of 
globalization has been the rise of the bargaining power of capital owners at the expense of public 
governments. To reduce tax inefficiencies while remaining competitive on the global stage, many 
jurisdictions lower their tax rates (Tanzi 1995). This paper observes individual records of the 
Current Population Survey to study the impact of the 2005 Ohio tax reform on labor market 
outcomes. The reform significantly reduced the corporate tax and the personal income tax over the 
period 2006-2010. I conclude that the personal income tax reduction significantly boosted (i) labor 
force participation for women specifically those with 5-year-old children and (ii) reported self-
employment taxable income, consistent with income shifting behavior in response to variations of 
marginal tax rates. In contrast, the corporate tax cut does not seem to have had a positive effect on 
corporate wages. These findings are robust to the inclusion of heterogeneous trends across states. 
Like national tax jurisdictions, local public governments engaged in a race to attract private firms. 
In the U.S., this competition features a decrease in corporate and personal income tax rates as well 
as the adoption of investment tax credits and other instruments to reduce costs to businesses.  
Average state corporate income tax rates increased from 3.7 percent in 1960 to a high of 7.0 percent 
in 1992 and have since fallen to 6.2 percent by 2014, the lowest it has been since 1981. The average 
state personal income tax rate increased from 5.3 percent in 1970 to a maximum of 6.2 percent in 
the mid-1980s before hitting an all-time low of 5.1 percent in 2010. Additionally, many U.S. states 
introduce incentives to promote a more attractive business environment. The average state 
investment tax credits rate rose from 0.2 percent in 1970 to 2.0 percent by 2010. 
One of the most recent comprehensive state tax reforms designed to spur growth and employment 
was adopted by the state of Ohio in 2005. The magnitudes of the cuts are staggering relative to 
other state tax changes. The reform eliminated property taxes on capital investment and machinery 
and abolished taxes on the sales of goods and services to customers outside of Ohio. It also set up 
a 0.95 percentage point reduction in personal income taxes and replaced the pre-existing Corporate 
Franchise Tax (CFT) of 8.6 percent by a Commercial Activity Tax (CAT) of 0.26 percent. These 
changes were gradually phased-in over the period 2006-2010. 
There is an abundance of empirical studies that have explored the incidence of tax reforms on 
economic activity or labor market outcomes. Most of this literature focus on specific taxes such as 
the payroll or the personal income tax (Gruber 1997, Cruces et al. 2009). Few papers explored the 
incidence of extensive reforms that involve several simultaneously implemented tax changes. In 
this case, economic scholars generally focus on national tax reforms like the U.S Federal Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 and use general equilibrium models (Altig et al. 2001, Auerbach & Kotlikoff 
1987, Fullerton et al. 1993) to simulate the incidence of different tax schemes on wages and 
employment. Alternatively, others measure this incidence with econometric models (Kubik 2006).  
Unfortunately, no such empirical work has been done at the U.S. state level. Unlike federal taxes, 
state tax systems which are more likely to be influenced by the political or business cycles, are 
overhauled regularly. This offers a unique opportunity to investigate the benefits of such policies 
in the short-run considering the forgone revenue for state governments. One should expect the 
incidence to differ from single tax changes, due to the interrelationships between several aspects 
of the tax code.  
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This could also serve as a valuable benchmark for the incidence of the newly adopted “Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act” of 2017. Even though the rate changes differ in magnitude, the reform in Ohio is 
comparable to the new federal tax code along one dimension. Both policies reduced the corporate 
and personal income tax rates simultaneously. However, they also differ in the sense that the 
federal “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” adopted a provision that features a different treatment for income 
earned by pass-through entities like self-employed individuals.  
This paper studies the impact of the 2005 Ohio tax reform. Specifically, I exploit the Public Use 
Microdata Survey from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to explore the effects of these 
substantial rate cuts on the Ohio workforce. I observe separate cross-sections of individuals over 
the period 2000-2015. The identification strategy is akin to a triple difference which compares 
wages, self-employment earnings and labor force participation for individuals living in Ohio to 
similar individuals in Pennsylvania. I consider several specifications, one of which controls for 
different economic trends across states, and capture selection into the labor force with a Heckman 
type methodology.  
My findings suggest that the personal income tax reduction significantly boosted participation for 
women, specifically those with 5-year old children and seems to have impacted self-employment 
earnings. The latter result is consistent with a literature (Clotfelter 1983, James Long 1982, Richard 
Goode 1976) that underscores a negative relationship between marginal tax rates and taxable 
income when tax filings involve some degree of compliance as is the case for self-employed 
individuals. These economic agents are more sensitive to tax rates because income earned is partly 
determined by voluntary cooperation and the possibility of retaining profits within the firm favors 
intertemporal income shifting. In contrast, I did not notice any significant positive effect of the 
corporate tax cut on wages.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the policy context with a detailed 
exposition of the tax reform. Section 3 briefly reviews the relevant literature, with a focus on the 
impact of comprehensive tax reforms. Section 4 presents a theoretical illustration, designed to 
highlight the challenges when measuring the tax incidence in this context. Section 5 describes the 
identification methodology and empirical strategy, while section 6 presents the data. Section 7 
analyzes the main results while section 8 presents the limitations and explores the avenues for 
future research on the incidence of comprehensive tax reforms. 
2. Policy context: Tax reforms in Ohio over 2005-2009 
2.1 Phase-in of the Commercial Activity Tax (CAT) 
The Corporate Franchise Tax (CFT) which is imposed on the activities of corporations operating 
in Ohio before the 2005 reform represents a flat rate of 8.6 percent applicable to the profits 
generated within the state. Beginning in 2006, the Corporate Franchise Tax (CFT) was 
progressively phased out up until 2010, when it was completely replaced by a Commercial Activity 
Tax (CAT) of 0.26 percent.  
Apart from the differential in rates, the new tax features an important distinction with regards to 
the taxable base. It is levied on all businesses irrespective of their legal form of organization and 
applies to gross receipts as opposed to the CFT which targets profits. During the phase-out period, 
corporations respectively paid 80 percent in 2006, 60 percent in 2007, 40 percent in 2008 and 20 
percent in 2009, of the pre-existing corporate franchise tax due. Additionally, the new CAT rate 
has been gradually phased-in from an initial rate of 5.6 percent in 2006 to its final full rate of 0.26 
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percent by 2010. The corporate tax cut is designed to reduce the cost of capital for entrepreneurs 
and unleash capital investment and productivity.  
The literature on corporate tax incidence has long defended that the impacts of business tax reform 
on wages in the long-run depend on (1) the degree of capital mobility across sectors, (2) the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in production, (3) the elasticity of substitution 
between products in consumption, (4) the factor intensities in production and (5) the elasticity of 
demand with regards to the corporate output (Harberger 1962, Martin & Davidson 1985, 
Raveendra 1975, and Gravelle 2006). Assumptions regarding these parameters determine the 
distribution of the corporate tax burden between workers, capital owners, and consumers.  
In the short-run, the tax effects are primarily driven by market imperfections (Felix et al. 2006, 
Arulampalam 2010 and Liu & Altshuler 2013). This builds on a rather heterodox tradition which 
emphasizes the role played by labor and product market institutions in the analysis of tax incidence. 
It is important to note that these studies do not measure the classical general equilibrium effects of 
the corporate tax on wages through investment. Instead, they seek to evaluate the effect of the tax 
inherent to differences in bargaining power between workers and firm owners, or the presence of 
market power that enables the shifting of the tax to consumers and workers.  
Also, a few papers have suggested that the incidence of corporate tax changes might be asymmetric 
(Ljungqvist 2014, Fuest et.al 2017) and tax cuts do not necessarily boost employment and wages 
in the short-run. However, given that the magnitude of the CFT reduction in Ohio is substantially 
higher than previous rate cuts, the anticipated incidence is uncertain at best. 
2.2 Phase-out of the property tax and investment credits on equipment and machinery 
Another significant change that was introduced in the Ohio tax code through the 2005 tax reform 
relates to the removal of the state property tax on equipment and machinery. Under the new tax 
code, manufacturing machinery and equipment are exempt from property taxation beginning in 
2006. The property tax on existing machinery and equipment, furniture and fixtures, and inventory 
is phased out starting in the tax year 2008 and ending with no tax due in 2009. This policy is 
designed to induce more investments specifically in manufacturing. However, the state also 
eliminated tax credits on machinery and equipment investments in 2009.  
The few empirical works that have explored the incidence of investment subsidies on growth and 
employment did not observe any substantial effects (Gravelle & Hungerford 2010). Other works 
studied the incidence of tax-induced changes in the user cost of capital on investments. The user 
cost of capital reflects the present discounted value of the marginal cost of a unit of investment. It 
accounts for the future stream of net returns associated with an asset including interest payments, 
property taxes, and credits on investment expenditures. Policy changes with regards to investment 
tax credits and the property tax on productive assets affect the user cost of capital. Chirinko and 
Wilson (2008) noted that corporate tax-induced changes in the user cost of capital affect state 
investment dynamics. The combined effect of these two offsetting changes on wages and 
employment will depend on the response elasticities of capital formation with respect to both 
instruments. 
2.3 Reduction of the personal income tax 
On top of the changes highlighted above, the Ohio legislature introduced a reduction by 21 percent 
of the personal income tax rate over the period 2006-2010. The initial rate of 7.2 percent is 
scheduled to be reduced in five annual increments (around 0.25 percentage point each), resulting 
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in a tax rate of 6.2 percent by 2010 and an overall reduction of 0.95 percentage point. The personal 
income tax reduction targets to induce higher household savings, incite labor participation and 
promote economic growth.  
There is a wealth of research (Eissa 2005, Gordon et al. 2007, Henrekson et al. 2007) on the 
incidence of personal income taxation on labor supply decisions. Most works observe labor market 
outcomes for individuals around policy reforms affecting the marginal income tax rate. The 
empirical consensus defends that marginal tax rates on personal income affect the supply of labor 
especially for individuals with a low attachment to the labor market such as married women. The 
behavioral response to the personal income tax could be investigated across several dimensions 
such as hours worked, wages, participation in the labor force or employment. I choose to explore 
the incidence of the Ohio tax reform on all these aspects (results on hours worked described in the 
Appendix).  
3. Relevant literature 
The literature on the economic effects of tax reforms could be divided into two main categories. 
Applied general equilibrium models adopt a theoretical framework where the incidence of 
alternative tax schemes is studied, and the most efficient structure is discussed (Altig et al. 2001, 
Auerbach & Kotlikoff 1987, Fullerton et al. 1993, Auerbach 2002, and Nickell 2003). The critical 
challenge here relates to the specification of several elasticity parameters for calibration.  
In contrast, empirical works exploit reduced-form models to investigate the impacts of tax changes 
on employment and wages. Using various identification approaches, these papers analyze 
variations in wages or employment around tax reforms (Gruber 1997, G. Cruces et al. 2009 and 
Jeffrey Kubik 2006). Many of these works consider specific reforms targeted at the taxation of 
labor or capital earnings, with a focus on national or federal reforms.  
The methodological challenge relates to the endogeneity of policy reforms. Tax changes could be 
motivated by pre-existing economic conditions that also affect current dynamics of wages and 
employment. To circumvent that shortcoming, scholars adopt identification strategies ranging 
from the “Narrative approach1” (Romer & Romer 1989, 2004, and Ramey & Shapiro 1998) to the 
“Structural Vector Regression method” (Blanchard & Perotti 2002). The main goal is to isolate 
the components of policy changes that vary exogenously from economic outcomes by exploiting 
political speech materials or the institutional design of tax collections. But recovering archival 
qualitative data is a daunting task2 especially at the state level and adopting the Structural Vector 
Approach requires the use of high-frequency time series on public finance aggregates that are not 
available for most states. For these considerations, this paper will not adopt such identification 
strategies. 
Other studies observe panels of individuals or firms and treat national tax reforms as exogenous 
policy changes from the perspective of these units (Gruber 1997, Cruces et al. 2009 and Kubik 
2006). This empirical approach compares variations in labor earnings and employment status of 
individual workers around tax reforms. The difference in difference approach that is usually 
adopted, requires the choice of an appropriate control group which would be observed over the 
same period to capture counterfactual developments. Gruber (1997) compare Chilean 
manufacturing firms around the dramatic payroll tax change of 1981 while Cruces et al. (2009) 
                                                          
1
 The Narrative Approach exploits speech materials by policymakers to identify exogenous policy reforms.  
2
 This would require collecting speech materials from state policymakers prior to the reform. 
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studied the relationship among payroll taxes, wages and employment inherent to policy-driven 
geographical variations within Argentina over the period 1995-2001. The critical challenge relates 
to the choice of a control group. The existence of potential heterogeneous trends in wages and 
employment across individuals or firms warrants the adoption of a methodology that captures pre-
existing dynamics across the observed units. I address this consideration in part by presenting 
results with state-specific time trends.   
Plus, most papers study national policy reforms and very few works examine comprehensive tax 
reforms. When they do, these papers focus on specific taxes within the overall reform. The most 
notable case relates to Jeffrey Kubik (2006) who studied the U.S Federal Tax Reform Act (TRA) 
of 1986 to examine the short-run effects of the change of labor taxation on the wage structure of 
several skills. The author utilizes the differential impact of the TRA on median marginal tax rates 
across several skills to analyze the incidence of the reform on labor supply. This approach might 
be problematic because of the interdependency between several aspects of the tax code. The 
measured impacts could just reflect the general equilibrium incidence of the overall tax reform. 
Other changes in the TRA might have affected the behavior of the control individuals which would 
bias the estimated tax effect.  
4. Conceptual framework 
The analytical model presented below considers the equilibrium in the labor market. I seek to 
demonstrate that the labor supply elasticity to the personal income tax cut cannot be measured in 
this context if one does not impose further assumptions on other key parameters. First, assume that 
production is carried out using capital and labor with respective prices r and w. Let τc and τf be the 
corporate and the personal income tax rates respectively. For simplicity, I do not include the tax τe 
on equipment and machinery, even though that does not alter the qualitative implications of the 
model. Considering that the statutory corporate tax is paid by the firm3 as a user of capital, 
equilibrium on the labor market is defined by the following equation: 
[ ] [ ]c f, r(1 τ ) (1 τ )D w S w+ = −                                                                                                                              (1) 
where D measures the demand for labor by the corporate sector and S refers to the supply of labor 
by households. Next, consider r to be the numeraire and set it equal to one, implying that w should 
be interpreted as the pre-tax relative price of labor. Total differentiation of the equilibrium 
condition (1) results in: 
f fd dr (1 τ ) d dτ
r
e
e e e
D D dS dS
w w w
w dw dw
∂ ∂
+ = − −
∂ ∂
                                                                                                                (2) 
where we=w(1-τf) and re=r(1+τc) represent respectively the net of tax wage rate and the gross of tax 
cost of capital for the firm. Dividing condition (2) by dw yields: 
c
f f
c
dτ (1 τ ) dτ
τ d de e
D D dS w dS
w w dw w dw
∂ ∂
+ = − −
∂ ∂
                                                                                                      (3) 
Multiply and divide equation (3) by w and D respectively while assuming D=S results in: 
                                                          
3 Theory of tax incidence suggests that this hypothesis does not matter for the distribution of the burden.  
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c
f
c
dτ (1 ) dτ
τ d f e e
D w D w dS w w dS w
w D w D dw S dw dw S
τ
∂ ∂
+ = − −
∂ ∂
                                                                                   (4) 
Before proceeding, it is worth highlighting the forces at play in equation (4). There are two main 
effects to be distinguished here. First, there is the direct effect of a tax on labor demand or supply. 
This relates to changes in the gross of tax price of a factor in equilibrium. The corporate tax, for 
instance, increases the gross of tax price of capital if one assumes away behavioral changes to the 
rate of interest in response to the tax. However, tax rate modifications usually generate general 
equilibrium effects on market outcomes i.e. dw with respect to (dτc or dτf). An increase in the 
corporate income tax will likely push net of tax interest rates downwards due to lower demand for 
capital by firms. Given these considerations, and after some basic mathematical manipulations 
(use dwe=(1-τf)dw, remember that r=1and dre=dτc and), equation (4) could be rewritten as: 
D D S Sc f
L K L L
log(1 τ ) log(1 τ )1
η +η η η
1+τ log logc w w
∂ + ∂ −
= +
∂ ∂
                                                                                          (5) 
where ηjS and ηjD represent the uncompensated supply and demand elasticities of labor with respect 
to the price of factor j. After renaming the wage elasticities with respect to the corporate tax and 
the personal income tax (uncompensated) as εc and εf respectively, equation (5) becomes: 
D D S S
L K L L
c f
1 1 1
η +η η η
1+τ ε εc
= +                                                                                                                                (6) 
It could be noticed that the two main parameters of interest in this context εc and εf cannot be 
estimated without imposing additional restrictions on other key elasticities. Consider for instance 
the partial equilibrium when only one of the personal income or the corporate tax is changed. 
Equation (6) reduces respectively to the familiar versions: 
S
L
f D S
L L
η
ε
η η
=
−
 and  
D
K
c D S
L L
η 1
ε
η - η 1+τ
c
=                                                                                                                (7)  
This derivation carries significant implications for empirical works trying to measure the incidence 
of the personal income tax (or corporate income tax) when several taxes are altered simultaneously. 
If, as is generally the case, one considers a panel dataset of individuals around the reform and some 
of these individuals were employed in the corporate sector prior to the reform, the estimated wage 
elasticities will be confounded by developments on the demand side of labor. This can be addressed 
by focusing on individuals that are only affected by the tax under consideration while assuming 
minimal general equilibrium effects.  
For these reasons and owing to the fact that I am only able to exploit repeated cross sections, I do 
not intend to measure any of the elasticities in equation (6). This approach would be problematic 
given that the reform in Ohio affected both the personal and corporate tax rates simultaneously. 
Instead, I seek to evaluate the combined effect of all these changes on labor market choices and 
outcomes for different groups of individuals namely self-employed, females and females with 5-
year-old children.  
By focusing on self-employed individuals, my goal is to get a sense of the incidence of the personal 
income tax on taxable income, given that this group of individuals is not directly impacted by the 
corporate tax and is generally considered to be sensitive to rate changes. In contrast, the choice of 
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females and females with young children is designed to capture the impact of the policy reform on 
individuals’ labor market choices. This group of economic agents is usually very sensitive to 
marginal income tax rates. I also look at variations in wages paid to individuals employed by large 
firms (with more than 250 employees) in Ohio around the reform to capture the demand side 
incidence of the reform. Theory and recent evidence on the association between union bargaining 
and the effects of corporate tax changes (Arulampalam, Devereux, and G. Maffini 2010) suggest 
that the dramatic corporate tax cut in Ohio could translate into higher wages in the short-run. 
5. Data 
This paper studies the impact of the 2005 Ohio tax reform on labor market outcomes in Ohio by 
observing individuals between the ages 25 and 64 over the period 2000-2015. I pooled several 
annual cross-sections obtained from IPUMS-CPS, an integrated dataset of the randomly-sampled 
March Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS data provide information on employment 
status, wages, industry, sociodemographic attributes, occupation affiliation and additional 
characteristics of the employer such as the size of the firm or incorporation status. The overall 
dataset contains 1,667,068 individuals. However, the samples of interests cover 485,721 persons.   
Dependent variables: My primary outcome variables are wages, self-employment earnings, and 
labor force participation status. The survey measures wages as the total nominal pre-tax wage and 
salary income that is, money received as an employee over a calendar year. I use consumer price 
index adjustment factors to convert this information into real employee compensation. The survey 
also indicates for every working-age individual whether the person was in the labor force and, if 
so, whether they were currently unemployed. I use this information to construct a dummy variable 
for a person’s labor force participation status.     
Individual characteristics: Given that the dataset does not provide the number of years of 
schooling. I impute this information from the nine categories of educational attainment used by 
the CPS. Following the tradition established by Mincer (1974), I compute work experience (exper) 
as the difference between age and the years of schooling minus six (experi =agei-si-6). This 
approach features some limitations but represents a good approximation of experience if one 
considers groups of individuals with a strong attachment to the labor market.   
Sociodemographic characteristics include marital status, age, number of children younger than 5 
years old, number of children between the ages of 6 and 20, gender and race. Other economic 
variables used in this analysis are the employment status, the occupation category of employment, 
annual wages, non-work income as well as the metropolitan status of the individual’s residence. 
Table A4 in the Appendix describes some summary statistics of the sample used in this analysis. 
6. Methodology 
6.1 Samples of interest  
The objective of tax reform is to boost economic activity in the state of Ohio. The policy change 
impacts labor supply decisions by individual workers and the demand for labor by firms. First, I 
focus on individuals between the ages 25 and 64. These are prime age workers with a strong 
attachment to the labor market. I excluded students and those working in the armed forces.  In 
some regressions, I compare changes in wages paid by large (more than 250 workers) firms around 
the tax cuts in order to capture the labor demand side incidence of the reform. Large firms are 
predominantly incorporated and observing wages paid by these units might potentially shed some 
light on the impact of the corporate tax cut. I also compare the effect of the policy on self-employed 
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individuals relative to others. This group of persons, generally treated as pass-through entities for 
the purpose of taxation are very sensitive to marginal tax rates. The possibility of retaining income 
in the business favors intertemporal income shifting to minimize tax liabilities.  
Last, I compare labor force participation for women and women with 5-year old children to others 
around the reform. Labor market participation is one of the key goals of the policy change in Ohio 
and as secondary earners, women and married women specifically are known to react swiftly to 
marginal rate changes. I choose here to focus on women with 5-year old children who face trade-
offs similar to those of married women in general but feature a higher opportunity cost of market 
work.  
6.2 Identification strategy  
The primary goal of this analysis is to study the impact of these policy reforms on individual 
earnings and labor participation in Ohio. The policy context is akin to a natural experiment which 
lends itself to a difference in difference methodology. First, I compare individuals living in Ohio 
with those living in Pennsylvania the policy reform. Next, I add a triple difference through the 
respective comparison between self-employed, women and women with young children and 
others. To obtain consistent estimates, it is important to control for the different confounding 
factors unfolding over time which affect labor market outcomes at the state and national level. 
This is crucial when one considers that the policy reform covers a period which features other 
remarkable shocks not only in the state of Ohio (other policy changes) but also at the national level 
(Great Recession).  
I compare individuals in Ohio to their peers in Pennsylvania, which is the only neighbor of Ohio 
that did not witness a reshaping of its political landscape or a tax-related policy reform over and 
after the treatment period. This state is expected to provide a better control for trends in wages, 
and labor force participation in Ohio due to geographic proximity. However, Pennsylvania could 
also be contaminated by the reform under consideration because of cross-border movements of 
goods and people.  
Figure 1: Growth of output in Ohio and Pennsylvania  
 
 
Figure 1 plots the growth rate of output in Ohio relative to the control state of Pennsylvania. The 
dynamics of the Gross State Product (GSP) are relatively similar across these two states. The 
resemblance is noticeable between Ohio and Pennsylvania. Considering that these two states are 
part of the U.S “Manufacturing Belt”, the graph suggests that they share similar trends in economic 
activities. It also supports the belief that adverse sectoral shocks that affect Ohio might translate 
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into lower output growth in neighboring Pennsylvania due to population, good and business cross-
border movements. I discussed below the extent to which spatial interactions of this nature would 
influence the estimates described in this paper.  
Difference-in-differences specifications assume that the treated and control region have the same 
trends in the absence of the policy (parallel trends assumption) and will generally fail to produce 
consistent treatment effect estimates if this assumption is not true. Table 2 describes the 
characteristics of individuals between the ages 25 and 64 living in Ohio relative to similar 
individuals in Pennsylvania prior to the tax reform. This comparison reveals important similarities 
regarding socioeconomic characteristics. To further justify the choice of the control group, I 
present in the Appendix graphs describing the trends of socioeconomic variables between the two 
states prior to the reform in Ohio. 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of sub-samples (controls and treated) over the period 2000-2005 
 OHIO PENNSYLVANIA 
 MEAN S.D. MEAN S.D. 
 
    
Age 43.05 10.34 43.42 10.20 
Male (%) 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 
White (%) 0.84 0.36 0.87 0.33 
Married (%) 0.68 0.47 0.69 0.46 
Years of schooling 13.44 2.46 13.52 2.65 
     
In the labor force (%) 0.81 0.39 0.80 0.40 
Employed (%) 0.95 0.21 0.95 0.20 
Self-employed (%) 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.29 
Living in a metropolitan area (%) 0.87 0.33 0.88 0.32 
With a salary employment (%) 0.72 0.45 0.73 0.44 
     
Number of children 1.17 1.24 1.19 1.22 
Number of children less than 5 y.o. 0.22 0.54 0.22 0.53 
Wage earnings ($ 1000) 39.16 39.82 42.04 47.80 
Number of Obs. 21,732 24,379 
 
It is important to be cautious regarding the parallel trend assumption given that the state of Ohio 
experienced a dismal economic growth relative to Pennsylvania in the years leading up to the 
reform4 and may have been slightly more impacted by the 2008 Great recession due to the relative 
importance of manufacturing in its economic structure5. I address the presence of a potential time-
variant heterogeneity across states by including state-specific trends in some regressions.   
6. Empirical strategy 
6.1 Selection bias 
Approximately one-fifth of the observations in my sample have missing wages because the 
individual is not in the labor force and is not working as a result, presenting a typical sample 
                                                          
4
 Over 2001-2005, the average growth of output stands at 1.0% in Ohio vs. 1.7% in Pennsylvania. 
5
 Over 2000-2007 manufacturing represents 22% of private GDP in Ohio vs. 17% in Pennsylvania. 
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selection problem. The sample of working individuals might not be random, and the unobserved 
factors that determine wages are likely to be correlated with the unobservables that influence a 
person’s decision to supply labor. It is well known that a simple OLS regression on the sample of 
individuals employed would yield biased and inconsistent estimates for the wage regressions.  
To correct for the sample selection bias, I adopt a Heckman-type methodology and add a first-
stage selection equation. Participation in the labor force and employment for individual i in state s 
over period t (empist) depends on the individual’s nonwork income (nwincist), education (educist), 
marital status (marriedist), number of children younger than 5 (child5ist), age of youngest child 
(yngchist), gender (femaleist) and an error term (uist).  
1 2 3 4 3 4 51 if nwinc educ child5 yngch married female female.child5 u 0
emp
0 otherwise
ist ist ist ist ist ist ist ist
ist
δ δ δ δ δ δ δ+ + + + + + + >
= 

     (8) 
This first-stage is identified by the variables “nonwork income” and “number of children younger 
than 5 years old” which are expected to affect incentives related to labor force attachment without 
altering potential wage earnings across individuals. In other words, these variables are excluded 
from the second-stage specification but help induce some variation in the probability of being 
employed according to equation (1).  
I also explore the incidence of the policy reform on an individual’s participation in the labor force. 
Given that the reform affects the marginal tax on labor earnings, it is expected to alter participation 
in the labor force at the margin particularly for females and females with young children by 
increasing the opportunity cost of unemployment. The policy reform represents an exogenous 
shock from the perspective of an individual and the period dummies help to identify the tax effects. 
The following equation is estimated using a linear probability model (LPM).     
0 1 2 3 41 if Z dohio d0610 d2011 dohio .d0610 dohio .d2011 u 0lfp
0 otherwise
ist it is is it is it is ist
ist
δ θ θ θ θ θ+ + + + + + >
= 

              (9) 
This choice is motivated by the consideration that the LPM lends itself to a straightforward 
interpretation of the parameters as marginal effects on the probability of being on the labor market. 
The standard errors are clustered at the state level and robust to the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
In addition to the set of controls Zist which refers to the right-hand side variables in specification 
(8), specification (9) includes a set of period and state dummies chosen to measure the incidence 
of the tax reform on labor force participation in Ohio. These include period dummies broken into 
three groups i.e. d2006 for period 2000-2005, d0610 for period 2006-2010, and d2011 for period 
2011-2015) and an indicator for the state of Ohio which equals one if the individual resides in 
Ohio. The period dummies are defined as such to reflect the timing of the policy.  
I consider a pre-treatment period (before 2006 which is the excluded period), a treatment period – 
d0610 – (2006-2010) and a post-treatment period –d2011– (after 2010). This specification captures 
average differences in wages between Ohio and Pennsylvania before the policy, over the policy 
period and after the adoption of the policy. The pre-treatment dummy ensures that any pre-existing 
heterogeneity in average wage differentials between the two states is controlled for. In the 
robustness analysis, I introduce two pre-treatment periods –2001-2003– and –2004-2005– in order 
to test the plausibility of the parallel trend assumption.    
12 
 
I could have used a lead-lag6 difference in difference structure with several year dummies however, 
I believe that the way the policy reform unfolded warrants the methodology described above. The 
fact that the schedule of the tax cuts over 2006-2010 where all announced ahead of time indicates 
that economic agents should have optimized labor market choices over and after the treatment 
period in response to the full policy package.  Of interests are the slopes of the interaction terms 
which measure the wage difference between individuals with similar characteristics living in Ohio 
and those in Pennsylvania over and after the policy reform period relative to the pre-policy period. 
Other specifications include state-specific trends. 
I am aware of the consideration that the comprehensive reform would affect both the demand and 
the supply of labor. The analysis carried out in this paper should be interpreted as a reduced form 
exercise that seeks to measure the impacts of the full policy package on labor market outcomes. 
The design and timing of the reform does not allow me to distinguish the labor supply response 
from the labor demand effects, though the self-employment, women, and women with young 
children results are likely tied to the labor supply component of the reform, whereas the large firm 
wage results represent a valuable insight with regards to the labor demand side of the policy. 
6.2 Second-stage: wage regressions 
The second stage of the regression studies wages and self-employment earnings for individuals 
living in Ohio who were targeted by the reform compared to similar individuals in other states. I 
control for the traditional determinants of labor market outcomes at the micro level i.e. education 
(educist), experience (expist), marital status (marriedist), a dummy variable indicating whether the 
individual lives in a metropolitan area (metroist), the occupation of the individual (occupist), and 
sociodemographic characteristics like gender (femaleist) and race (whiteist).   
This set of control variables is chosen to compare labor market outcomes between individuals with 
similar sociodemographic characteristics before and after the Ohio reform. The regression is akin 
to a matching estimator, which compares earnings across different cells of the covariates across 
states and over time. The standard errors are clustered at the state-year level to capture the fact that 
individuals living in the same state are subject to identical policy upheavals. Depending on the 
specification, I also include, a general time trend and a state-specific pre-policy trend. The 
dependent variable yist represents wages while the control variables are included in the matrix Xist 
according to the following equation. 
0 1 2 3 4log(y ) βX dohio d0610 d2011 dohio.d0610 dohio .d2011 vist ist it is is it it is istα α α α α= + + + + + +              (10) 
I chose to control for occupation rather than industry for a few reasons. First controlling for both 
is problematic (Joshua Angrist and J.S. Pischke 2002). Second, even though they are both 
endogenous, the response elasticity of industry of work to economic shocks is generally higher 
than that of occupation. Unlike industry, occupation which is highly correlated with the sector of 
work is more likely to remain unchanged in the face of policy shocks that alter wage incentives 
across industries especially in the short-run. The rest of the variables are period dummies broken 
into three groups (before 2006, between 2006-2011 and after 2010) and an indicator for the state 
of Ohio which equals one if the individual resides in Ohio.     
The period dummies are defined as such to reflect the timing of the policy. I consider a pre-
treatment period (before 2006), a treatment period (2006-2010) and a post-treatment period (after 
                                                          
6
 I do present in the appendix a parsimonious exposition of the results with a lead-lag difference in difference structure.  
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2011). Given that the treatment period covers the Great Recession of 2008 which represents an 
adverse shock to the U.S. economy in general, this specification captures average differences in 
wages between Ohio and Pennsylvania before the policy, over the policy period and after the 
adoption of the policy. The pre-treatment dummy ensures that any pre-existing heterogeneity in 
average wage differentials across states is controlled for.     
7. Main results and Discussion 
7.1 Effects on wages 
Table 3 reports the results of the second-stage Heckman regression for all specifications.. The first 
three columns (columns 1-3) compare individuals living in Ohio to similar peers in a control set 
of 14 states carefully selected,  while the last two columns (columns 4-5) considers as control for 
Ohio the neighboring state of Pennsylvania. The first column describes the results of the baseline 
model with state or year fixed effects. The coefficients of the interaction terms suggest that the 
state tax reform of 2005 did not translate into substantial wage gains for prime-age workers in 
Ohio. The negative and statistically significant estimate of the post-reform interaction parameter 
reflects the widening wage differential for workers living in Ohio relative to their peers in other 
states. On average, over the period 2011-2015, the wage differential between an employed prime 
age individual living in Ohio and a comparable individual living in the set of control states was 
5.0 percent lower than it was over the pre-reform period of 2000-2005. The estimates of the 
coefficients on the individual socioeconomic characteristics included to control for systematic 
differences in wage variations, which are not reported in table 3 are highly significant in all 
specifications. This parameter remains negative even when one considers as controls, individuals 
living in Pennsylvania (column 4). It should also be noticed that over the treatment period, the 
estimated coefficient is negative with the inclusion of state and year fixed effects, regardless of the 
control group considered.  
In contrast, when including state-specific time trends (columns 3 and 5), the parameter of interest 
turned positive and significant, signaling a meaningful impact of the tax reform on wages. The 
estimated effects range from 3% to 5% depending on the specification adopted. This finding 
reinforces the hypothesis that U.S. states feature different trends in wages due to a heterogeneity 
in growth opportunities. It also lends support to the belief that the state of Ohio was on a different 
possibly higher wage growth trajectory prior to the reform. The estimate implies that relative to 
trend, individuals living in Ohio did not experiment a drop in wages after the reform. This result 
also confirms that the estimated negative effects of the previous specification might be misleading 
because wages were moving in a different direction in the state of Ohio relative to other states 
prior to the reform. Relatedly, I also notice that the negative wage differential between Ohio and 
the controls over the treatment period 2006-2010, disappears with the introduction of state-specific 
trends, even though the estimated coefficients are highly imprecise in this latter scenario. 
Column 3 presents a specification with region effects to capture the existence of time-invariant 
unobservables at the regional level. The estimated coefficient remains positive and significant with 
the addition of state-specific trends. This specification seeks to control for regional heterogeneity. 
Notice that state fixed effects cannot be identified when regional time-invariant effects are 
accounted for. Similar to the results from the specification above, the measured effects imply a 
significant increase of 3% in wages after the policy package was adopted for individuals living in 
Ohio relative to comparable peers in the control states.    
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Table 3: Main results: Effects on wages 
 
  
               Control set 1 (a)   Control set 2 (b) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ohio indicator   0.04*** 0.09*** 0.08 0.004*** 0.06*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.001) (0.00) 
2006-2010 indicator   -0.02 -0.01 -0.01** -0.03 -0.05*** 
   (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
2011-2015 indicator   -0.01 -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.02 -0.08*** 
   (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) 
Ohio x 2006-2010 indicator   -0.05*** 0.00 0.00 -0.04*** 0.03*** 
   (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ohio x 2011-2015 indicator   -0.05*** 0.03** 0.03*** -0.06*** 0.07*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
State fixed effects     Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects   Yes No No Yes No 
State-specific trends   No Yes Yes No Yes 
Region fixed effects   No No Yes - - 
All sociodemographic controls (*)   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations                                                                                 354,569                                     89,132 
Notes: the dependent variable is the log average real wage for individuals between the ages 25-64. Standard errors are in parentheses 
and clustered by state. (*) Sociodemographic controls include gender, marital status, race, experience, experience squared, education, 
the metropolitan status of residence, and occupation. These characteristics were all significant at 1%. (a) Control set includes 
Pennsylvania and (b) control set includes Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee. Excluded state from the regression is Alabama. Model estimated using 
a Heckman type selection model with a first-stage equation of selection. 
7.2 Effects on wages for large-firm employees 
The measured effects in the previous section can only be interpreted as reduced-form parameters 
and should not be directly associated to any specific tax change in the policy package. As discussed 
in the conceptual framework, given that the reform targeted both the corporate and the personal 
income tax, it is necessary to consider units that are only affected by either one of these taxes if 
one intends to relate the measured effect to a specific tax instrument. I do so, by considering 
individuals working for large firms that employ more than 250 employees. These enterprises are 
predominantly incorporated, and observing wages paid to this group of individuals could provide 
valuable insight with regards to the incidence of the corporate tax cut in Ohio. 
Excluding self-employed entrepreneurs, a substantial portion of businesses operating in the U.S. 
are registered as Corporations (Subchapters C and S). In 2010, they represent 69% of all firms 
according to statistics provided by the Census Bureau and employ about 70% of the national 
workforce. A break-down of the statistics of incorporation by size offers some useful insights with 
regards to the appropriate sample to be studied for the analysis of the corporate tax. Of the 
businesses that employ more than 250 workers, 85% are incorporated employing about 92% of the 
corporate workforce, which suggests that this sample of firms would better represent corporate 
firms in general.  
Besides, a recent strand of the corporate tax literature (See Arulampalam et al. 2010) highlights 
the direct incidence of the corporate tax operating through the bargaining process between workers 
and entrepreneurs. According to this line of thought, the corporate tax cut in Ohio should entail 
higher wages in the short-run. I investigate this possibility with a triple difference which compares 
wages paid to individuals employed by large firms (predominantly incorporated), relative to all 
other employees before and after the policy between Ohio and the control geographies. The results 
described in table 4 do not support the hypothesis of a sharing of the extra corporate profits induced 
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by the rate cut with workers. This finding holds true both during and after the policy unfolded. The 
coefficients of interests (Last 2 rows with the triple interactions in table 4) are negative for the 
treatment period regardless of the specification, indicating that employees of large firs in Ohio 
actually experienced a higher drop in wages relative to other employees in the state over the period 
2006-2010. In contrast, this difference varies widely depending on the specification and is not 
quite conclusive over the post-treatment period 2011-2015.     
Table 4: Main results: Effects on wages for big firms’ employees7 
 
  
               Control set 1 (a)   Control set 2 (b) 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Big firm indicator   0.171*** 0.165*** 0.171*** 0.200*** 0.208*** 
   (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.004) (0.001) 
Big firm x Ohio indicator   0.064*** 0.060*** 0.054*** 0.016*** 0.003*** 
   (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001) 
Big firm x 2006-2010 indicator   -0.003 0.015* 0.011 -0.000 -0.010*** 
   (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.000) 
Big firm x 2011-2015 indicator   0.006 0.002 -0.007 0.009 -0.016*** 
   (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.000) 
Big firm x Ohio x 2006-2010 indicator   -0.037*** -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.010*** 
   (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000) 
Big firm x Ohio x 2011-2015 indicator   -0.020** -0.010 -0.002 -0.016*** 0.010*** 
   (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000) 
State fixed effects     Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects   Yes No No Yes No 
State-specific trends   No Yes Yes No Yes 
Region fixed effects   No No Yes - - 
All sociodemographic controls (*)   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations                                                                                 354,569                                     89,132 
Notes: the dependent variable is the log of wages for individuals between the ages 25-64. Standard errors are in parentheses. (*) 
Sociodemographic controls include gender, marital status, race, experience, education, the metropolitan status of residence, and 
occupation. These characteristics were all significant at 1%. (a) Control set includes Pennsylvania and (b) control set includes 
Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee. Excluded state from the regression is Alabama. Model estimated using a Heckman type selection model with 
a first-stage equation of selection. 
7.3 Effects on self-employment earnings 
The policy reform in Ohio affected both the taxation of personal and corporate income but to 
different magnitudes. The personal income tax has been reduced by 21% over the period 2006-
2010. This change might affect incentives related to the reporting of earnings, particularly for self-
employed individuals. This hypothesis is consistent with a wealth of empirical findings (James 
Long 1982, Richard Goode 1976, Saez 2010, le Maire & Schjerning 2013) that have suggested 
that taxable income is sensitive to marginal income tax rate especially for self-employed 
individuals for whom taxation involves some degree of voluntary compliance. The argument 
implies that a reduction of the income tax rate might induce a higher reporting of self-employment 
income.     
I explore this possibility by comparing self-employment earnings of individuals living in Ohio to 
similar individuals in the control geographies. To do so, I use a triple difference identification 
                                                          
7
 Define O, D1, D2 and B as dummy variables for Ohio, period 2006-2010, 2011-2015, and large firm employee respectively. X 
represents the matrix of individual characteristics as previously defined. The triple difference specification is the following: 
0 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 5 6 1 7 2 8 1 9 2log(y ) βX O B D D O.D O.D O.B B.D B.D O.B.D + O.B.D vist ist istα α α α α α α α α α α= + + + + + + + + + + +  
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strategy that compares changes in wages paid to self-employed individuals to wages paid to all 
other workers around the reform between Ohio and the controls states. The triple difference allows 
me to control for other unobservable confounding factors that affect wages dynamics in treated 
and control states.  I found strong evidence in support of a short-term increase in income reported 
by self-employed businesses in Ohio over the period 2006-2010 when the income tax cut unfolded. 
The coefficient of the treatment period interaction term carries a positive value which is 
statistically significant at the one percent level in all specifications. The results in table 5 (Columns 
1-5, last 2 rows) imply a 12% increase in income reported by self-employed economic agents 
during the period 2006-2010. This parameter is robust to the inclusion of state-specific trends as 
well as the consideration of alternative control sets. However, the positive effect shrinks over the 
post-treatment period 2011-2015 and remains significant only when individuals living in 
Pennsylvania are used as controls. There is a clear indication that small businesses which are 
predominantly treated as pass-through entities for the purpose of taxation reported a higher 
income8 in the immediate aftermath of the tax cut in Ohio. This can be done by shifting taxable 
profits across time periods and exploiting a number of tricks that allow these firms to retain 
earnings within the business. For instance, some expenditures that are deductible can be made in 
a given year but claimed in a different year to minimize tax liabilities. Unfortunately, this paper 
could not clearly identify the accounting mechanics at the source of this result. Doing so would 
require additional details on the balance sheet and operating costs of self-employed businesses, 
which is not provided by the CPS dataset.   
Importantly, the result also suggests that the benefit of the tax cut on taxable income was temporary 
and did not last through the post-treatment period (or waned down slowly). This finding is 
consequential for the debate on the benefits of tax breaks. The implications are twofold. First, if 
the argument in favor of rate reductions is motivated by efficiency concerns, there is considerable 
reason (from theory and empirical evidence) to believe that such a goal can be achieved. However, 
if the goal is to promote a higher collection of tax revenue, it remains to be proved that this target 
can be reached in the long-run. The explanation for such patterns may very well lie within the field 
of behavioral economics. Plus, the short-lived nature of the spike in reported taxable income is 
associated with an increase in hours worked, though substantially limited in comparison to the 
earning rise.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
                                                          
8
 This increase in reported income does not seem to be due to a higher activity. I tested that possibility by looking at hours worked. 
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Table 5: Main results: Effects on self-employment earnings9 
 
  
               Control set 1 (a)   Control set 2 (b) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Self-emp. indicator   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06*** 0.04*** 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) 
Self-emp. x Ohio indicator   -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12*** -0.12*** 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) 
Self-emp. x 2006-2010 indicator   -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02*** -0.03*** 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
Self-emp. x 2011-2015 indicator   -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.06*** -0.06*** 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
Self-emp. x Ohio x 2006-2010 indicator   0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
Self-emp. x Ohio x 2011-2015 indicator   0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07*** 0.07*** 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
State fixed effects     Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects   Yes No No Yes No 
State-specific trends   No Yes Yes No Yes 
Region fixed effects   No No Yes - - 
All sociodemographic controls (*)   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations                                                                                 354,569                                     89,132 
Notes: the dependent variable is the log of wages for individuals between the ages 25-64. Standard errors are in parentheses. (*) 
Sociodemographic controls include gender, marital status, race, experience, education, the metropolitan status of residence, and 
occupation. These characteristics were all significant at 1%. (a) Control set includes Pennsylvania and (b) control set includes 
Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee. Excluded state from the regression is Alabama. Model estimated using a Heckman type selection model with 
a first-stage equation of selection.  
 
7.4 Effects on labor force participation 
The results in Table 5 describes the probability of participating in the labor market for individuals 
living in Ohio relative to others (i.e. equation 9) around the reform. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the person is in the labor force and 0 otherwise. This is a Linear 
Probability Model (LPM) with robust standard errors. In addition to the socioeconomic 
determinants of an individual’s wage earnings present in the wage regressions, I included several 
controls affecting labor force participation such as the number of kids aged 5 years old or less and 
non-work income. Controlling for systematic determinants of earnings allow me to compare 
individuals with identical wage potentials. The choice of the LPM specification is motivated by 
the need to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients of interests. The results in table 5 (last 
two rows of columns 1-5) do not seem to support the hypothesis of a positive boost of labor force 
participation in Ohio.     
Compared to similar peers in the control states, prime age individuals in Ohio actually experienced 
a drop in labor participation by 0.1% (columns 1,2,4) using a specification that accounts for state 
and year fixed effects. This decline is even more pronounced when state-specific trends are 
controlled for, with a range of estimates that vary between -1 and -3% depending on the control 
set.  These estimates indicate that the difference in labor participation between the state of Ohio 
and the control states is 1-3% lower during and after treatment relative to the pre-treatment period 
                                                          
9 Define O, D1, D2 and S as dummy variables for Ohio, period 2006-2010, 2011-2015, and self-employed respectively. X represents 
the matrix of individual characteristics as previously defined. The triple difference specification is the following: 
0 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 5 6 1 7 2 8 1 9 2log(y ) βX O D D O.D O.D O.S S.D S.D O.S.D + O.S.D vist ist istSα α α α α α α α α α α= + + + + + + + + + + +  
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2000-2005. This finding lends support to the hypothesis that labor force participation was heading 
to a different direction in the state of Ohio.  
The result presented above is not dramatically at odds with the literature of the incidence of 
marginal tax rates on labor participation for prime-age workers. Nonetheless, when the focus is 
directed to specific groups such as married or educated women, the evidence tilts in favor of a 
significant relationship between labor supply and tax rates. I consider this possibility in the next 
two sections by exploring the effect of the policy reform on labor force participation for women 
and women with young children (less than 5 years old) who feature a much higher opportunity 
cost of employment due to the increased attention required for home education.     
 
Table 5: Main results: Effects on labor force participation  
 
  
               Control set 1 (a)   Control set 2 (b) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ohio indicator   
-0.001*** 0.025*** -0.006 0.001 0.015** 
   (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.002) 
2006-2010 indicator   -0.002*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.004 0.011*** 
   (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
2011-2015 indicator   -0.003*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.004* 0.003*** 
   (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Ohio x 2006-2010 indicator   -0.001*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.001** -0.011*** 
   (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.00) (0.000) 
Ohio x 2011-2015 indicator   -0.001*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.001* -0.021*** 
   (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
State fixed effects     Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects   Yes No No Yes No 
State-specific trends   No Yes Yes No Yes 
Region fixed effects   No No Yes - - 
All sociodemographic controls (*)   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations                                                                                 390,281                                     97,007 
Notes: the dependent variable is a dummy variable for employment status for individuals between the ages 25-64. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. (*) Sociodemographic controls include gender, marital status, race, experience, education, the metropolitan status 
of residence, occupation, non-work income and number of children less than 5 years old. (a) Control set includes Pennsylvania and 
(b) control set includes Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee. Excluded state from the regression is Alabama. Model estimated with a LPM specification. 
 
7.4.1 Labor participation for women 
Economic theory defends that the relationship between marginal tax rates and labor force 
participation is mediated by the opportunity cost of unemployment. In other words, the labor 
supply response to personal income tax cuts varies across socioeconomic groups depending on the 
trade-off at the center of labor market choices. There is widespread evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that married and highly educated women tend to respond swiftly to marginal tax 
reductions (Mincer 1962). Indeed, during the pre-treatment period, 2000-2005, labor force 
participation for women varies within the range 74-75% both in Ohio and the overall sample 
compared to 88-89% participation rate for men. A more than plausible explanation to this disparity 
can be found in the trade-off between home and market production, which women, in general, 
have to consider while optimizing labor participation choices.   
I explore the impact of the policy reform on women’s participation with a triple difference that 
compares variations of labor force participation for women living in Ohio to other prime-age 
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individuals around the reform. The results in table 6 support the presumption that the reform 
boosted labor force participation for women by 0.3-0.4% after the treatment period. However, this 
finding does not hold true during the treatment period. This might just reflect an information bias 
related to the fact that individuals are not immediately aware of the change. It certainly highlights 
the fact that women, in general, might not represent the appropriate sample to be considered when 
analyzing the extensive response of labor supply to changes in the opportunity cost of 
unemployment. In the next section, I reduce the analysis to women with young children who face 
a flatter slope of the supply curve due to child care costs.  
 
Table 6: Main results: Effects on labor force participation for women10 
 
  
               Control set 1 (a)   Control set 2 (b) 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Female indicator   -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female x Ohio indicator   
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female x 2006-2010 indicator   0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.002** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female x 2011-2015 indicator   0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female x Ohio x 2006-2010 indicator   0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.007** -0.007** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female x Ohio x 2011-2015 indicator   0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State fixed effects     Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects   Yes No No Yes No 
State-specific trends   No Yes Yes No Yes 
Region fixed effects   No No Yes - - 
All sociodemographic controls (*)   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations                                                                                 390,281                                     97,007 
Notes: the dependent variable is a dummy variable “In the labor force for individuals between the ages 25-64. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. (*) Sociodemographic controls include gender, marital status, race, experience, education, the metropolitan status of 
residence, occupation, non-work income and number of children less than 5 years old. (a) Control set includes Pennsylvania and 
(b) control set includes Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee. Excluded state from the regression is Alabama. Model estimated with a LPM specification. 
 
7.4.2 Labor participation for women with young children 
A significant portion of the literature on the labor supply response of women to marginal tax rates 
focus on married women (Mincer 1962, Connelly 1992), young women (Hayghe 1997) or educated 
women (Mincer 1962). Very few empirical works focused on women with young children who 
face a flatter slope of the supply curve due to childcare costs that reduce the benefits of market 
work. To illustrate this point consider the following stylized facts from the sample used in this 
paper. Over the period 2000-2005 (prior to the tax reform in Ohio) labor force participation for 
women with children between the ages 0 and 5, was about 65%, well below the 82% rate for the 
rest of prime-age individuals. In Ohio, the participation rate of these women equals 68% compared 
to 81% for the rest of the sample over the same period. Focusing on this group presents two main 
                                                          
10 Define O, D1, D2 and F as dummy variables for Ohio, periods 2006-2010, 2011-2015, and female respectively. X represents the 
matrix of individual characteristics as previously defined. The triple difference specification is the following: 
0 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 5 6 1 7 2 8 1 9 2lfp βX O D D O.D O.D O.F F.D F.D O.F.D + O.F.D uist ist istFα α α α α α α α α α α= + + + + + + + + + + +  
 
20 
 
advantages. First, it enables the inclusion of single mothers with young kids who are the target of 
several public programs and policies. Second, since about 75% of women with young children are 
married, the former sub-sample basically sums up the response of the latter group to the policy 
change.    
There is a wealth of empirical works and discussions on the range of policies that can be used to 
promote higher labor participation women and married women in particular (Mincer 1962, 
Connelly 1992). Though subsidized or publicly provided childcare is generally presented as better 
policy targets, marginal tax rates are part of an arsenal of instruments at the disposal of 
policymakers. I study in this section, the effects of the tax reform on labor force participation for 
women with 5-year old children with the triple difference approach I have been using so far. The 
results in table 7 indicate that the reform boosted labor participation for this group by 1.0-1.2% 
over the treatment period and 0.9-1.4% post-treatment. This result complements previous findings 
on married women.  
 
Table 7: Main results: Effects on labor force participation for women with young children11 
 
  
               Control set 1 (a)   Control set 2 (b) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fem 5. indicator   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.003 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fem 5. x Ohio indicator   
-0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
Fem 5. x 2006-2010 indicator   0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fem 5. x 2011-2015 indicator   0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006** 0.006** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fem 5. x Ohio x 2006-2010 indicator   0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fem 5. x Ohio x 2011-2015 indicator   0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
State fixed effects     Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects   Yes No No Yes No 
State-specific trends   No Yes Yes No Yes 
Region fixed effects   No No Yes - - 
All sociodemographic controls (*)   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations                                                                                 390,281                                     97,007 
Notes: Fem. 5 represents a dummy for women with less than 5 years old children. The dependent variable is a dummy variable “In 
the labor force” for individuals between the ages 25-64. Standard errors are in parentheses. (*) Sociodemographic controls include 
gender, marital status, race, experience, education, the metropolitan status of residence, occupation, non-work income and number 
of children less than 5 years old. (a) Control set includes Pennsylvania and (b) control set includes Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee. Excluded state 
from the regression is Alabama. Model estimated with a LPM specification. 
 
8. Limitations and avenues for future research 
This paper observes several snapshots of middle age individuals between the ages 25-64 over the 
period 2000-2015. Given that the analysis does not feature a longitudinal study of working age 
                                                          
11 Define O, D1, D2 and F5 as dummy variables for Ohio, periods 2006-2010, 2011-2015, and female with 5 y.o. kids respectively. 
X represents the matrix of individual characteristics as previously defined. The triple difference specification is the following: 
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persons exposed to the policy, the results described here are confounded by changes to the structure 
of the workforce in Ohio. This could occur if the policy intervention spurs a higher inflow of 
individuals to the state. To the extent that the resulting in-migration flow does not alter the 
composition of workers across different cells of the socioeconomic controls, these estimates 
provide a valuable approximation of the effects of the tax reform on labor market outcomes.  
The negligible estimated effect of the tax change on labor force participation and wages might just 
reflect a population inflow that reshapes the composition of the labor market of Ohio. 
Unfortunately, there is no continuous series of cross-state migration flows over an extended period. 
However, the Census Bureau through the State to state migration flow tables provides net 
migration statistics over five-year periods for each state. Over the period 2005-2010, the state of 
Ohio actually featured a negative net migration of 170,470 individuals equivalent to 1.5 percent of 
its 2005 population. This implies that the in-migration of population that would bias the estimated 
effects probably did not occur.  
To provide additional support to this conclusion, I also analyze the dynamics of population growth 
in the state around the policy reform. Figure 3 which plots the growth of population in the state of 
Ohio relative to its neighbors over the period 1970-2015, confirm this hypothesis. I consider the 
possibility of minimal population growth in Ohio being associated with an upsurge in the migration 
of working age individual as a highly unlikely scenario since it would imply a restructuring of the 
age composition of the state’s residents.  
 
Figure 3: Growth of population in Midwestern states 
  
 
Considering that the reform changed several taxes simultaneously, I was not able to relate the 
estimated effects to a particular tax, which limits the opportunity to draw meaningful conclusions 
for other policy considerations. I tried to avoid analyzing equilibrium outcomes that are determined 
by several moving parts especially if those separate components are affected by the reform. I rather 
directed my attention to specific groups and outcomes, for which observed variations can be 
plausibly associated with specific instruments in the policy package. This methodology is not 
without flaws, even more so if one assumes that general equilibrium effects are not negligible. The 
absence of a significant change in the wages paid to employees of large firms, for instance, points 
clearly to the nonexistence of a meaningful direct impact of the corporate tax cut on wage earners. 
However, if the labor supply response induced by the personal income rate reduction is large 
enough to disrupt the labor market, it would be difficult to capture the incidence of the corporate 
tax cut. Using a triple difference identification strategy cushions in part against this limitation since 
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any labor market disruptions would also affect other groups of workers in Ohio.  The same 
discussion is valid for the results on self-employment earnings which would have been 
contaminated by other developments on the productive side, had it not be for the triple difference 
method that captures these factors.         
Last,  the ideal set-up would require using a longitudinal dataset of individuals and observe how 
incentives to work and earnings are changed by the policy. This would not only allow me to control 
for individual heterogeneity but also to observe annual variations in labor market outcomes for the 
treated population relative to the appropriate control group. The relevance of my results rests upon 
the hypothesis that the reform did not dramatically alter the composition of the Ohio workforce 
with regards to unobservable individual characteristics. The only publicly accessible longitudinal 
dataset I could have used is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). I learned with a quick 
examination that this dataset is not representative at the state level and features a non-negligible 
rate of cross-state migration over time.  
9. Conclusion 
Secular stagnation and ever-decreasing levels of corporate tax collections around the globe 
contributed to the re-emergence of a widespread interest in tax reform. Both ideologies of the 
political spectrum in the U.S favor some changes to the current tax system. The unsatisfactory 
empirical evidence which does not usually provides room for an asymmetrical response to tax 
changes limits the scope for policy interventions. There is a good reason to believe that tax 
increases and reductions do not trigger the same behavioral reactions from economic agents and 
that dramatic reforms are more likely to cause significant upheavals in labor market outcomes. 
This paper explores the economic incidence of state tax cuts by studying the impact of the 2005 
Ohio tax overhaul on wages, self-employment earnings, and labor force participation for women 
and women with young children.  
I observe several cross-sectional random samples interviewed through the microdata survey of the 
Current Population Survey (IPUMS-CPS) over the period 2000-2015 and compare groups of 
individuals in Ohio to similar individuals in (i) a set of control states and (ii) Pennsylvania, before, 
during, and after the reform.  
My preferred specification with state-specific trends suggests that the reform significantly boosted 
wages by 3-7%. It also seems to have increased the average reported self-employment earnings by 
7-12% depending on the specification. This finding is consistent with a literature (Long 1982, 
Goode 1976, Le Maire and Scherjning 2013) that defends that the degree of voluntary compliance 
involved in the taxation of self-employment returns reflects on the sensitivity of this type of income 
to tax differentials. As a comparison, the self-employment taxable income elasticity found by Le 
Maire and Scherjning 2013 is 14-20%. In addition, the large-firm employee wage results 
complement the conclusion that corporate tax cuts do not systematically boost wages as evidenced 
by other empirical works (Ljungqvist and Smolyansky 2014, Fuest et al. 2017). The results 
described in this paper imply that in the short-run the windfall of a corporate tax cut is not 
necessarily shared with employees. However, the extra revenue could be reinvested or used to 
repurchase shares (Chetty and Saez 2003). Unfortunately, I am not able to explore these 
dimensions for the Ohio reform. I also noticed that the reform increased participation on the labor 
market especially for women with young children by 0.9-1.4%, consistent with previous empirical 
findings on the topic.    
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One major caveat of this analysis is that since I am not able to observe a longitudinal dataset, the 
relevance of my results rests upon the hypothesis that the reform did not dramatically alter the 
composition of the Ohio workforce with regards to unobservable individual characteristics. To 
circumvent this shortcoming, I could have used an alternative source of data such as the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). However, a brief investigation reveals that this dataset is not 
representative at the state level and features a substantial rate of cross-state migration over time. 
Additionally, this paper did not explore the extent to which the Ohio tax reform affected hours of 
work supplied by individuals due to the poor quality of this variable in the dataset. That intensive 
margin of the response might be more meaningful than the extensive margin investigated here.  
Importantly, the measured wage effects only relate to short-run impacts and cannot be extrapolated 
to other contexts. The long-run incidence might be higher than what is reported in this analysis, 
and one should expect investment patterns to react to the dramatic corporate tax cut over a longer 
time frame. It would also be misleading to automatically relate the findings in Ohio to other policy 
considerations at the federal level especially with regards to the recently adopted tax code. 
Nonetheless, the self-employment results suggest that any federal reform that alters the tax 
treatment of different sources of income would likely induce a higher reporting of certain earnings 
in the short-run.  Finally, the timing of the reform did not enable me to disentangle the separate 
effects of the corporate tax cut from the personal tax and the property tax reductions since the 
changes were introduced simultaneously.    
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Appendix A: Tables  
Table A1: Effects on hours worked  
 
  
               Control set 1 (a)   Control set 2 (b) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ohio indicator   
-0.016*** -0.019*** -0.003 0.005*** 0.012*** 
   (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
2006-2010 indicator   -0.036*** -0.044*** 0.005** -0.020*** -0.016*** 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
2011-2015 indicator   -0.027*** -0.037*** 0.009** -0.013 -0.010 
   (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) 
Ohio x 2006-2010 indicator   0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.008*** 0.002*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ohio x 2011-2015 indicator   -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.010*** 0.007*** 
   (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
State fixed effects     Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects   Yes No No Yes No 
State-specific trends   No Yes Yes No Yes 
Region fixed effects   No No Yes - - 
All sociodemographic controls (*)   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations                                                                                 354,569                                     89,132 
Notes: the dependent variable is the log of hours worked. Standard errors are in parentheses. (*) Sociodemographic controls include 
gender, marital status, race, experience, education, the metropolitan status of residence, occupation, non-work income and number 
of children less than 5 years old. (a) Control set includes Pennsylvania and (b) control set includes Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee. Excluded state 
from the regression is Alabama. Model estimated using a Heckman type selection model with a first-stage equation of selection. 
 
Table A2: Effects on employment  
 
  
               Control set 1 (a)   Control set 2 (b) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ohio indicator   
-0.011*** -0.008*** -0.002** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
   (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2006-2010 indicator   -0.043*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.032** 0.014*** 
   (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
2011-2015 indicator   -0.022*** 0.011*** 0.010*** -0.018** 0.026*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Ohio x 2006-2010 indicator   -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.013*** -0.013*** 
   (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ohio x 2011-2015 indicator   0.005* 0.012*** 0.013*** -0.004** -0.003*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
State fixed effects     Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects   Yes No No Yes No 
State-specific trends   No Yes Yes No Yes 
Region fixed effects   No No Yes - - 
All sociodemographic controls (*)   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations                                                                                 390,281                                     97,007 
Notes: the dependent variable is a dummy variable for the individual’s employment status. Standard errors are in parentheses. (*) 
Sociodemographic controls include gender, marital status, race, experience, education, the metropolitan status of residence, 
occupation, non-work income and number of children less than 5 years old. (a) Control set includes Pennsylvania and (b) control 
set includes Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee. Excluded state from the regression is Alabama. Model estimated with a LPM specification. 
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Table A3: Effects on hours worked for self-employed individuals  
 
  
               Control set 1 (a)   Control set 2 (b) 
 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4) (5) 
Self-emp. indicator   0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Self-emp. x Ohio indicator   0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.011** -0.011** 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Self-emp. x 2006-2010 indicator   -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
Self-emp. x 2011-2015 indicator   -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) 
Self-emp. x Ohio x 2006-2010 indicator   0.013** 0.013** 0.013** -0.024*** -0.023*** 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
Self-emp. x Ohio x 2011-2015 indicator   0.026*** 0.027*** 0.027*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
   (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
State fixed effects     Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects   Yes No No Yes No 
State-specific trends   No Yes Yes No Yes 
Region fixed effects   No No Yes - - 
All sociodemographic controls (*)   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations                                                                              390,281                                         97,007 
Notes: the dependent variable is the log of hours worked for individuals between the ages 25-64. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
(*) Sociodemographic controls include gender, marital status, race, experience, education, the metropolitan status of residence, and 
occupation. These characteristics were all significant at 1%. (a) Control set includes Pennsylvania and (b) control set includes 
Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee. Excluded state from the regression is Alabama. 
 
Table A4: Effects on hours worked for women with young children12 
 
  
               Control set 1 (a)   Control set 2 (b) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fem 5. indicator   -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.018*** -0.018*** 
   (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fem 5. x Ohio indicator   
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.035*** 0.036*** 
   (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fem 5. x 2006-2010 indicator   0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
   (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005) 
Fem 5. x 2011-2015 indicator   0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 
   (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
Fem 5. x Ohio x 2006-2010 indicator   -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
   (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fem 5. x Ohio x 2011-2015 indicator   -0.015** -0.015** -0.015** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
State fixed effects     Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects   Yes No No Yes No 
State-specific trends   No Yes Yes No Yes 
Region fixed effects   No No Yes - - 
All sociodemographic controls (*)   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations                                                                                 390,281                                     97,007 
                                                          
12 Define O, D1, D2 and F5 as dummy variables for Ohio, period 2006-2010, 2011-2015, and female with 5 y.o. kids respectively. 
X represents the matrix of individual characteristics as previously defined. The triple difference specification is the following: 
0 1 5 1 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 5 5 6 5 1 7 5 2 8 5 1 9 5 2lfp βX O F D D O.D O.D O.F F .D F .D O.F .D + O.F .D uist ist istα α α α α α α α α α α= + + + + + + + + + + +  
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Notes: Fem. 5 represents a dummy for women with less than 5 years old children. the dependent variable is the log of hours worked 
for individuals between the ages 25-64. Standard errors are in parentheses. (*) Sociodemographic controls include gender, marital 
status, race, experience, education, the metropolitan status of residence, and occupation. These characteristics were all significant 
at 1%. (a) Control set includes Pennsylvania and (b) control set includes Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee. Excluded state from the regression is 
Alabama. 
 
Table A4: Description statistics of the overall sample 
 MEAN S.D. 
 
  
Age 44 11 
Male (%) 49.9 50.0 
White (%) 80.9 39.3 
Married (%) 65.4 47.6 
Years of schooling 14 3 
In the labor force (%) 79.8 40.1 
Employed (%) 94.7 22.4 
Self-employed (%) 12.0 32.5 
Living in a metropolitan area (%) 76.1 42.6 
With a wage and salary employment (%) 67.8 46.7 
Number of children 1.1 1.2 
Number of children less than 5 years old 0.2 0.5 
Wage earnings ($) 43,412 50,244 
Number of Obs.                                      1,667,068 
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Appendix B: Figures 
 
Figure B1: Corporate Franchise Tax (CFT) and Personal Income Tax (PIT) in Ohio 
  
 
 Figure B2: Estimated effects with a lead-lag specification (with extended control set) 
 
 Fig (a)                                                                                  Fig(b) 
 
 Notes: DD and DDD estimates relative to the excluded year 2000. These estimates are obtained using a specification that abstracts 
from aggregating treatment and non-treatment periods. Instead, the model interacts the dummy for Ohio with year dummies (Fig 
a) and year + self-employed dummies (Fig b). The goal is to provide an idea of the information that is missed with the approach 
adopted in this paper, consisting of breaking the time frame into three sub-periods (pre, during and post-treatment). The results 
presented on the graph relate to the extended control set (13 states). The model is estimated like all wage regressions in this paper 
with a Heckman type methodology. 
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